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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________  
No: 02-3387
____________
MARIA MATOS,  c/o ALICIA COLON,
               Appellant
        v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
                                            
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No.00-cv-05783)
District Judge: Honorable John C. Lifland
                                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on June 3, 2003
Before: ALITO, ROTH and STAPLETON Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed       September 11, 2003  )
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O P I N I O N
                              
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Maria Matos has appealed the July 3, 2002, final order of the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey.  The order affirmed the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security to deny Matos’s application for supplemental security
income (SSI).  Matos originally applied for SSI benefits on May 3, 1995, through her
mother and legal custodian Alicia Colon.  
Matos suffers from neurological impairment.  She received a total score of 77 on
an Intelligence Quotient (IQ) test, indicating that she is within the borderline range of
intellectual functioning.  She was placed in an individualized education plan (IEP) in
1995.  According to an IEP report, Matos’s intellectual achievement was at one time more
than one year behind her intellectual potential.  However, she had made progress towards
achieving the goals of her IEP and she was eventually mainstreamed into regular classes
in math, art, music, and physical education, while remaining in special classes for her
other subjects.  Between the 1990-91 and 1994-95 school years, Matos’s report card
improved greatly, moving from a “C” in behavior and a “F” in work habits to “B’s” in
both areas.
Matos has other relevant physical and mental conditions.  In 1993 Matos was
3hospitalized and diagnosed with symptoms of asthma.  In May 1995 Doctor Chang
diagnosed Matos with Moderate Opposition Deficit Disorder.  In August 1995, Dr. G.
Victor, a state agency psychological consultant, reviewed Matos’s records and opined that
Matos was improving in her physical and behavioral abilities but that she suffered from
oppositional disorder and had a history of asthma.  Most importantly, he stated that Matos
had moderate limitations in her cognitive, personal, and behavioral development and
functions; less than moderate limitations in communicative functions and in maintaining
concentration, persistence and pace; and no limitations in motor or social development
and function.
We have jurisdiction of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291.  Our standard of
review is whether the District Court correctly found the Commissioner’s decision to be
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 1383(©)(3); Plummer v. Apfel,
186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).   Substantial evidence is evidence adequate enough for a
reasonable mind to support the conclusion. Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427.  Contradictory
evidence may be found in the record, but is not cause for reversing the Commissioner’s
decision if substantial support exists for the decision within the record.  Sykes v. Apfel,
228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).  The fact that a reviewing court may have made a
different decision is not important as long as the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ)
decision is based on a reasonable interpretation of substantial evidence.  Schonewolf v.
Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997).
4In order for the reviewing court to perform its duty and to “avoid judicial
usurpation of administrative functions”, we have required ALJ’s to provide a statement of
reasons or findings.  Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (1981).  This statement should
include any important findings subordinate to final findings and an explanation of what
evidence was accepted and rejected in reaching the final decision.  Id.
Turning to the merits of this appeal, a minor is disabled if she has “a medically
determinable . . . impairment which results in marked and severe functional limitations . .
. which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not more than 12
months.”  42 U.S.C. § 1382(c)(3)(C)(I) (2000).  Determining whether a child is disabled
is a three step process.  20 C.F.R. § 416.924 (2003).   ALJ must find that (1) the claimant
is not engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) the claimant suffers from one or more
severe impairments; and (3) the impairment meets, medically equals, or is functionally
equivalent in severity to an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P. App. 1
(Listing of Impairments).  If the claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal any
impairment specified in the Listings, the Commissioner evaluates all of the child’s
functional limitations caused by a disability.  For a disability to be functionally
equivalent, the limitations caused by the disability must be the same as the limitations
caused by a listed impairment.  20 C.F.R. §416.924 (2003).
Following the required process, the ALJ found that Matos was not disabled.  He
determined that Matos’s asthma did not create symptoms serious enough to qualify as
5impaired under the listing and that her mood disorder did not approach what is necessary
to be considered an affective mood disorder.  Moreover, he concluded that her borderline
intelligence was not low enough to satisfy any of the 4 possible requirements for mental
retardation.  20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P. App 1 § 112.00 (2003).
As for her claim of problems with inattention, impulsiveness, and hyperactivity, 
Dr. Victor specifically concluded that Matos had less than moderate limitations in
maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace and no limitations in motor or social
development and function.  Additionally, she had a consistently improving school and
behavioral record.  The ALJ concluded that, taking her mental condition as a whole,
Matos had no limitation severe enough to satisfy any listing.  Moreover, after careful
review, the ALJ concluded that none of her impairments were the functional equivalent of
a listed impairment. 
We agree with the Commissioner and the District Court that the evidence
supporting the ALJ’s decision is substantial and more importantly that there is little
evidence that contradicts that decision.  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
By the Court,
/s/Jane R. Roth
                                                                            
     Circuit Judge 
